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Abstract
The default mode network (DMN) is a set of brain regions that consistently shows higher activity at rest compared to tasks
requiring sustained focused attention toward externally presented stimuli. The cognitive processes that the DMN possibly
underlies remain a matter of debate. It has alternately been proposed that DMN activity reflects unfocused attention toward
external stimuli or the occurrence of internally generated thoughts. The present study aimed at clarifying this issue by
investigating the neural correlates of the various kinds of conscious experiences that can occur during task performance.
Four classes of conscious experiences (i.e., being fully focused on the task, distractions by irrelevant sensations/perceptions,
interfering thoughts related to the appraisal of the task, and mind-wandering) that varied along two dimensions (‘‘task-
relatedness’’ and ‘‘stimulus-dependency’’) were sampled using thought-probes while the participants performed a go/no-go
task. Analyses performed on the intervals preceding each probe according to the reported subjective experience revealed
that both dimensions are relevant to explain activity in several regions of the DMN, namely the medial prefrontal cortex,
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus, and posterior inferior parietal lobe. Notably, an additive effect of the two dimensions
was demonstrated for midline DMN regions. On the other hand, lateral temporal regions (also part of the DMN) were
specifically related to stimulus-independent reports. These results suggest that midline DMN regions underlie cognitive
processes that are active during both internal thoughts and external unfocused attention. They also strengthen the view
that the DMN can be fractionated into different subcomponents and reveal the necessity to consider both the stimulus-
dependent and the task-related dimensions of conscious experiences when studying the possible functional roles of the
DMN.
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Introduction
During the last decade, the default mode network (DMN) of the
brain—a network of brain regions that includes the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)/
restrosplenial cortex (Rsp), the medial and lateral temporal lobes,
and the posterior inferior parietal lobes (pIPL)—has become the
object of intensive focus and research in neuroscience [1,2]. The
DMN is particularly active during rest states (with a high degree of
functional connectivity between its constituent regions) and shows
reduced activity during a variety of demanding tasks in which
sustained focused attention and the cognitive processing of
externally presented stimuli is required [3,4,5,6]. This decrease
of activity is likely to reflect the suspension of cognitive processes
that are active at rest [7], although the precise nature of these
processes remains currently debated [8,9,10,11].
Some authors have argued that higher DMN activity corre-
sponds to a shift of perspective from current external information
to internally generated cognitions [12,13]. In keeping with this
proposal, it has been found that subjective reports of task-
unrelated thoughts during cognitive tasks (i.e., supposedly mind-
wandering about past and future events) are related to increased
activity in the DMN [7,8,11,14,15,16]. Furthermore, DMN
activity has been observed in a variety of tasks involving the
generation of thoughts and images that are decoupled from the
current external environment, such as in autobiographical
memory retrieval, episodic future thinking, and social cognition
[17,18,19,20,21,22]. Finally, evidence from resting state functional
connectivity studies indicates that the DMN is strongly negatively
correlated with other brain regions usually engaged in the
performance of cognitive tasks requiring sustained attention to
external stimuli, including lateral prefrontal and parietal areas
[23,24].
The proposal that DMN activity corresponds to the occurrence of
mind-wandering and internal cognitions is not consensual, however.
Some authors have argued that DMN activity might support the
general, unfocused monitoring of the external environment rather
than internal thoughts [9,25]. In line with this view, it has recently
been shown that brief projections of task-unrelated visual stimuli
during the maintenance phase of a working memory task result in
increased activity in DMN regions [26]. Larger DMN activity has
also been demonstrated in conditions where participants simply
have to monitor the occurrence of external stimuli compared to
conditions where these stimuli have to be maintained and
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manipulated in mind [27,28]. Finally, it has also been argued [9]
that the previously mentioned reports of task-unrelated thoughts do
not necessarily reflect mind-wandering. They could as well
represent the capture of attention by task-unrelated stimuli (e.g.,
external noises or hunger sensations, labeled here as external
distractions [29,30,31]). The increased DMN activity that has been
linked to task-unrelated reports might therefore reflect a state of
unfocused attention in which salient interoceptive and exteroceptive
perceptions that are irrelevant to the task at hand are nonetheless
monitored.
These two views on the possible function of the DMN (i.e., mind-
wandering and unfocused external attention) are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. It is conceivable that activity in the DMN
reflects a general state of unfocused attention in which both internal
representations (i.e., thoughts and memories that are unrelated to
the immediate environment) and task-unrelated external stimuli
(i.e., interoceptive and exteroceptive information) are gathered and
monitored [5,32]. Another possibility would be that distinct regions
of the DMN are involved in mind-wandering and unfocused
external attention. Recent findings have indeed demonstrated that
the DMN can be fractionated into different subcomponents
[33,34,35], and some authors have proposed that, among the
different regions of the DMN, the most rostral part of the MPFC is
specifically related to unfocused attention towards external stimuli,
while an adjacent but more caudal portion of MPFC would be
specifically involved in considering one’s own and others’ mental
states (i.e., mentalizing [9,36]). Finally, it also remains to be
determined whether the link between the DMN (or some of its
constituent regions) and internal cognitions is specific to task-
unrelated thoughts (e.g., mind-wandering about events that
occurred in the past days or about what to do during the upcoming
week-end) or whether it is also associated with thoughts related to
the appraisal of the current task, such as thinking about the task
length or about mistakes committed in past trials (i.e., task-related
interferences [37,38,39]). In summary, DMN activity might reflect
(1) the occurrence of thoughts that are both decoupled from stimuli
present in the current environment and unrelated to the task
currently being carried out (mind-wandering), (2) a state of
unfocused attention towards external task-unrelated stimuli (exter-
nal distractions), (3) attention towards self-generated internal
thoughts, independently of whether or not the content of these
thoughts is related to the task at hand (mind-wandering and task-
related interferences), or (4) a mixture of these phenomena, with
perhaps distinct regions of the DMN supporting distinct processes.
A number of previous fMRI and PET studies have begun to
investigate the possible function of the DMN by examining
correlations between brain activity and different types of conscious
experiences. Some studies have inferred mind-wandering indi-
rectly, by varying task demands to influence the probability of task-
unrelated thoughts and estimating the frequency of mind-
wandering episodes by collecting data outside the scanner
[7,8,11,14,15,40]. Results from these studies raise some problems
of interpretation, however, because there were no online measures
of conscious experience taken during scanning and it is therefore
possible that the observed DMN activations are due to factors
other than mind-wandering [9,10]. Other studies have directly
sampled participants’ ongoing conscious experience in the scanner
[16,41]. For example, Christoff et al. [16] investigated the neural
correlates of task-unrelated thoughts while the participants
performed the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART, a
go/no-go task [42]) with the use of the thought-probe method
[43,44]. This method consists in interrupting the task currently
being performed at various random intervals by ‘‘probes’’ and
asking participants to report the kind of conscious experience they
had in the few trials preceding the interruption. The combination
of the thought-probe method with the SART has successfully been
used in several studies, demonstrating a relation between off-task
conscious experiences and decreased task performance (e.g.,
[38,45,46]), as well as changes in various physiological measures,
such as event-related potentials, heart rate, and galvanic skin
response [38,47,48]. In their study, Christoff et al. [16] found that
task intervals for which off-task thoughts were reported were
associated with increased DMN activity. Interestingly, the dorsal
anterior cingulate and lateral prefrontal cortex were also engaged
during off-task thoughts, suggesting a processing overlap between
mind-wandering and central executive resources.
Although these neuroimaging findings suggest that mind-
wandering is associated with the recruitment of both DMN and
executive network regions, it should be noted that participants
were simply asked to report whether they were totally focused on
the proposed task (on-task reports) or were distracted by task-
unrelated thoughts (off-task reports). This dual-choice format does
not permit to clearly distinguish between mind-wandering,
external distractions, and task-related interferences, such that
these three types of conscious experiences might have been mixed
into the same response category [9,16]. Conceptually, the different
conscious experiences that can occur while performing a task
requiring focused attention and the processing of external stimuli
can be characterized along two dimensions: ‘‘task-relatedness’’ and
‘‘stimulus-dependency.’’ Together, these two dimensions define
four classes of conscious experiences (see Figure 1) that can be
defined as (1) task-related and stimulus-dependent (i.e., being fully
focused on the current task), (2) task-related and stimulus-
independent (i.e., task-related interferences), (3) task-unrelated
and stimulus-dependent (i.e., external distractions), (4) task-
unrelated and stimulus-independent (i.e., mind-wandering).
In order to clarify the role of the DMN in mind-wandering versus
unfocused external attention, the present study used a factorial
design in which participants reported their conscious experiences in
terms of both task-relatedness and stimulus-dependency while they
performed the SART. Thus, four possibilities of responses to
thought-probes were included, corresponding to the four classes of
conscious experiences defined above. Our first aim was to
investigate the brain regions that were specifically associated with
the two defining dimensions of these conscious experiences.
Furthermore, we examined the brain regions that were specifically
related to (1) task-related interferences, (2) external distractions, and
(3) mind-wandering, in comparison to being fully focused on the
SART. A conjunction analysis was also performed to identify the
brain regions that were more active during mind-wandering
compared to both task-related interferences and external distrac-
tions. Finally, region of interest (ROI) analyses were performed in
order to investigate whether distinct subregions of the MPFC that
have been identified in previous studies (see above) are differentially
sensitive to task-relatedness and stimulus-dependency. Results of
these analyses demonstrate the relevance of our finer-grained
conceptualization of ongoing conscious experiences for explaining
variations in DMN activity. Both the ‘‘task-relatedness’’ and
‘‘stimulus-dependency’’ dimensions were indeed related to activity
in several regions of the DMN, suggesting that these regions
underlie cognitive processes that are active during both internal
thoughts and unfocused external attention.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All participants gave their written informed consent to take part
in the study, in line with the Declaration of Helsinki, and the study
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was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Medical School of
the University of Lie`ge.
Participants
Twenty-two right-handed adults (17 women) aged between 18
and 30 years (mean age = 22 years) participated in the experiment.
None of the participants had any history of neurological or
psychiatric disorder.
SART with thought-probes
The version of the SART used in the study was adapted from
Christoff et al. [16]. Stimuli (numbers between 1 and 9) were
presented sequentially at the center of the screen. Participants
were asked to respond as fast and accurately as possible to the
numbers and to withhold the response when presented with the
number 3 (the target stimulus). The interstimulus interval was
1750 msec, and the duration of each stimulus (target and non-
target) was 450 msec. This slow presentation rate introduced by
Smallwood et al. [38] was used because it has previously been
demonstrated to increase the probability of off-task reports in
comparison to faster presentation rates (e.g., 1250 msec [49]). All
participants signaled the presence of each non-target number via a
manual finger press on a response key. Within each block of trials,
target and non-target probability was randomized with the
constraints that the last five stimuli of each block (i.e., stimuli
presented just before the thought-probe) were non-targets. The
average probability of target stimuli across blocks was 10%. Blocks
were of five different durations and comprised 13, 15, 17, 19 or 21
stimuli. In total, 65 blocks were administrated in the fMRI session.
Each block was immediately followed by a thought-probe which
interrupted the task. For each probe, participants were asked to
characterize the conscious experience they had in the few trials
prior to the probe, according to the two dimensions ‘‘task-
relatedness’’ and ‘‘stimulus-dependency’’ described above
(Figure 1). Four possible choices were thus provided, each being
associated with a specific response key: (1) task-related and
stimulus-dependent experience (i.e., on-task reports): the partici-
pant’s attention and thoughts are fully focused on the task-related
stimuli (i.e., the numbers); (2) task-related and stimulus-indepen-
dent experience (i.e., task-related interferences reports): the
participant experiences thoughts about the task that are not
directly related to the numbers presented on the screen and, thus,
that do not help him/her to have the best possible performance on
the current ongoing trials (e.g., thoughts about task duration or
about the participant’s overall performance); (3) task-unrelated and
stimulus-dependent experience (i.e., external distractions reports):
the participant’s attention is diverted by stimuli that are present in
the current environment but unrelated to the task at hand (e.g.,
exteroceptive perceptions, such as noises, the luminance, the
temperature or others features of the current environment or
interoceptive sensations, such as feeling thirsty, tired or other
physical sensations); (4) task-unrelated and stimulus-independent
experience (i.e., mind-wandering reports): the participant has his/
her attention decoupled from exteroceptive/interoceptive percep-
tions and is experiencing thoughts unrelated to the task at hand
(e.g., thoughts about what the participant did last evening, about
what he/she needs to do this evening or about what significant
others could be doing now). Responses to thought-probes were
Figure 1. Dimensions of ongoing conscious experiences. Conceptual division of ongoing conscious experiences occurring during tasks
requiring sustained externally-driven attention according to their ‘‘stimulus-dependency’’ and ‘‘task-relatedness’’ dimensions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016997.g001
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self-paced. After each probe, a fixation cross was displayed on the
screen for a variable duration (random normal distribution with a
mean duration of 4500 ms and standard deviation of 1000 ms).
In order to familiarize participants with the thought-sampling
method, they first performed a version of the SART with thought-
probes outside the scanner in an interval ranging from five to one
day(s) before the fMRI session. In this first session, after being
presented with the instructions and before performing the SART,
participants were trained in classifying ten sentences representing
different conscious experiences in order to familiarize them with
the four response categories, and were presented with a short
example of the SART (ten numbers, two targets, and two thought-
probes). Then, they performed 40 blocks of the SART. They were
given a paper sheet with the instructions for responding to the
probes and were told that they could keep it for the whole SART
and check it in case they felt uncertain about the definition of the
four response possibilities. A final training of approximately six
minutes was also performed in the scanner immediately before the
fMRI session, during the structural MR acquisition.
MRI acquisition
Data were acquired on a 3 Tesla scanner (Siemens, Allegra,
Erlangen, Germany) using a T2* sensitive gradient echo EPI
sequence (TR=2130 ms, TE= 40 ms, FA 90u, matrix size
64664632, voxel size 3.463.463.4 mm3). Thirty-two 3-mm thick
transverse slices (FOV 22622 cm2) were acquired, with a distance
factor of 30%, covering the whole brain. Between 1360 and 1472
functional volumes were acquired. The first three volumes were
discarded to account for T1 saturation. A structural MR scan was
obtained at the beginning of the session (T1-weighted 3D MP-
RAGE sequence, TR=1960 ms, TE=4.4 ms, FOV 23623 cm2,
matrix size 25662566176, voxel size 0.960.960.9 mm). Head
movement was minimized by restraining the subject’s head using a
vacuum cushion. Stimuli were displayed on a screen positioned at
the rear of the scanner, which the subject could comfortably see
through a mirror mounted on the standard head coil.
fMRI analyses
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM5
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, http://www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc.,
Sherborn, MA). Functional scans were realigned using iterative
rigid body transformations that minimize the residual sum of
squares between the first and subsequent images. They were
normalized to the MNI EPI template (voxel size: 26262 mm) and
spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel with full-width at half
maximum (FWHM) of 8 mm.
For each participant, BOLD responses were modeled at each
voxel, using a general linear model. Following the procedure by
Christoff et al. [16], intervals of five trials (including only non-
targets) preceding each probe were modeled as epoch-related
responses (beginning at the onset of the fifth trials preceding the
probe and ending just before the onset of the probes), according to
the four kinds of responses given to the probes. The probes were
also modeled as epoch-related responses (beginning at the onset of
the probes and ending at their offset), using a single regressor.
Target stimuli and non-target stimuli were modeled as event-
related responses. The design matrix also included the realignment
parameters to account for any residual movement-related effect.
The canonical HRF was used. A high pass filter was implemented
using a cut-off period of 256 seconds in order to remove the low-
frequency drifts from the time series. Serial autocorrelations were
estimated with a restricted maximum likelihood algorithm with an
autoregressive model of order 1 (+white noise). Four linear
contrasts were performed, looking at the effect of each kind of
response given to the probes relative to baseline. The correspond-
ing contrast images were smoothed (6-mm FWHM Gaussian
kernel) in order to reduce remaining noise due to inter-subject
differences in anatomical variability in the individual contrast
images.
The individual summary statistics images of these four linear
contrasts were then entered in second-level analyses, correspond-
ing to random-effects models. A 2 (task-relatedness)62 (stimulus-
dependency) whole-brain voxel-wise repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was first performed, which allowed us to
examine the brain regions that are specifically related to the two
dimensions of interest in this study. Then, we investigated the
brain activations specific to task-related interferences relative to
being fully focused on the task (task-related interferences.on-task),
external distractions relative to being fully focused on the task
(external distractions.on-task), and mind-wandering relative to
being fully focused on the task (mind-wandering.on-task), using t-
tests. A conjunction analysis testing the conjunction null hypothesis
[50] was also performed to explore the brain regions that were
more active during mind-wandering compared to both task-
related interferences and external distractions [(mind-wander-
ing.task-related interferences) > (mind-wandering.external
distractions)]. For a priori regions of interest, statistical inferences
were corrected for multiple comparisons using Gaussian random
field theory at the voxel level in a small spherical volume (radius
10 mm) around coordinates selected from the literature on the
DMN and from previous studies focusing on the neural correlates
of go/no-go tasks and executive control of attention. These a
priori regions of interest concerned areas in MPFC (26, 52,22; 6,
53, 28) [8,33], rostral MPFC (210, 68, 20) [36], PCC/precuneus
(28, 256, 26) [33], left pIPL (244, 274, 32; 240, 276, 40)
[22,33], left Rsp (214, 252, 8) [33], left parahippocampal cortex
(PHC; 228, 240, 212) [33], left middle and inferior temporal
gyrus (MTG and ITG; 260, 224, 218; 268, 236, 24) [22,33],
right ITG (51, 213, 225) [51], bilateral middle frontal gyrus
(245, 30, 30; 48, 30, 30) [52,53] and left anterior IPL (252, 249,
47) [35]. The coordinates reported in the studies by Mason et al.,
Toro et al., and Weisman et al. [8,51,52] were transformed to the
MNI space using a nonlinear transformation (http://imaging.mrc-
cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/MniTalairach). For completeness, the
supplementary tables also list other regions that survived a
threshold of p,0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons with
a minimum cluster size of 15 voxels, but these regions are not
discussed further.
Finally, ROI analyses were performed in order to investigate the
possible distinction between a rostral portion versus a more caudal
portion of the MPFC. Gilbert et al. [36] found that a rostral region
of the MPFC (210, 68, 20) was associated with attention towards
external stimuli, whereas an adjacent but more caudal—and
somewhat more dorsal—region of MPFC (28, 54, 30), highly
similar to the one associated with mind-wandering [8,10], was
related to mentalizing. In this study, an ROI analysis using
coordinates of these two regions was performed in order to
investigate whether they are differentially sensitive to the two
dimensions of conscious experiences investigated here. For each
participant, parameter estimates (mean beta weights) were derived
from the rostral MPFC (averaged over all voxels within a 4 mm
radius sphere of the peak voxel: 210, 68, 20) and the more caudal
MPFC (averaged over all voxels within a 4 mm radius sphere of
the peak voxel: 28, 54, 30) for each of the four conditions (relative
to the baseline). A 2 (task-relatedness)62 (stimulus-dependency)62
(regions) repeated measures ANOVA was then performed on the
parameter estimates.
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Results
Behavioral data
Mean response time for non-targets was 405 msec (SD=112).
Response withholding accuracy for targets was 62.28%
(SD=16.94). Regarding thought-probes, participants reported
being on-task for 31.59% (SD=14.27) of probes, task-related
interferences for 22.13% (SD=7.62) of probes, external distrac-
tions for 25.44% (SD=10.04) of probes, and mind-wandering for
20.83% (SD=11.17) of probes.
Next, we examined the impact of the four types of reports on
response times (RTs) for the five non-target stimuli preceding each
probe. A 2 (task-relatedness)62 (stimulus-dependency) repeated
measures ANOVA on mean RTs was performed. Mean values
and standard deviations are detailed in Table 1. Analysis on mean
RTs did not demonstrate any main effect of task-relatedness
[F(1,21) = 0.66; p=0.42; partial g2=0.03] or of stimulus-depen-
dency [F(1,21) = 0.42; p=0.52; partial g2=0.02], and the
interaction was not significant either [F(1,21) = 0.25; p=0.62 ;
partial g2=0.01]. A second ANOVA was conducted on the
variability of RTs (as assessed by the coefficient of variation; the
ratio of the standard deviation s to the mean m): we observed a
main effect of task-relatedness [F(1,21) = 4.39; p,0.05; partial
g2=0.17], no main effect of stimulus-dependency [F(1,21) = 1.90;
p=0.18; partial g2=0.08], and a significant interaction
[F(1,21) = 8.71; p,0.01; partial g2=0.29], indicating that reports
of being completely focused on the task were preceded by more
stable RTs than the three other classes of reports (all ps,0.05;
Tukey’s HSD test). There was no significant difference between
the three other kinds of reports.
We also examined the effect of the four types of reports on
response accuracy for the whole block of trials. We performed a 2
(task-relatedness)62 (stimulus-dependency) repeated measures
ANOVA on the number of errors to the target stimuli. Mean
values and standard deviations are detailed in Table 1. The
ANOVA demonstrated a main effect of task-relatedness
[F(1,21) = 7.74; p,0.05; partial g2=0.27], no main effect of
stimulus-dependency [F(1,21) = 3.08; p=0.09; partial g2=0.13],
and a significant interaction [F(1,21) = 28.10; p,0.01; partial
g2=0.57], indicating that reports of being completely focused on
the task were preceded by fewer errors to the targets than the three
other kinds of reports (all ps,0.05; Tukey’s HSD test). There was
no significant difference between the three other types of reports.
In order to examine whether the time spent on the SART had
an impact on the distribution of responses to thought-probes, an
index of the effect of time on probe responses was calculated for
each of the four kinds of reports according to the following
formula: number of reports for the 32 last blocks of the SART –
number of reports for the 32 first blocks of the SART. Mean
values of this index were 21.86 (SD=4.03) for reports of being
fully focused on task, 20.09 (SD=3.07) for task-related interfer-
ences reports, 1.73 (SD=4.46) for external distractions reports,
and 0.23 (SD=3.05) for mind-wandering reports. Examination of
the 95% confidence intervals revealed that the frequency of
reports of being fully focused on task decreased with time on the
task (23.65; 20.08). None of the other kinds of reports
significantly increased/decreased in frequency with time on the
SART: task-related interferences (21.45; 1.27), external distrac-
tions (20.25; 3.71), and mind-wandering (21.13; 1.58). Combin-
ing these indexes revealed that the time spent on the SART had no
effect on task-unrelated reports (M=1.95, SD=4.72, CI=20.14;
4.05) and stimulus-independent reports (M=0.14, SD=4.39,
CI=21.81; 2.08). These results indicate that the time spent on
the SART had minor impact on the distribution of responses to
the thought-probes in this study and thus cannot fully account for
the fMRI results.
Overall, the behavioral data on SART performance are
consistent with previous studies using a similar method [46,54]
and provide a behavioral validation of the finer-grained thought-
probe method used in this study to assess the four classes of
conscious experiences of interest. With regards to the effect of time
on task, it should be noted that contrary to the present study,
several previous studies using thought-probes found that the
frequency of off-task reports increased with the time spent on a
task [38,46,54,55]. The absence of time effect in this study could
be explained by the fact that participants were extensively trained
with the SART both in the days preceding and immediately before
the fMRI session, which could have reduced the effect of time on
task during the functional acquisition.
fMRI data
Brain regions associated with task-relatedness and
stimulus-dependency. First, in order to examine the brain
regions associated with the two dimensions of conscious
experiences of interest, a 2 (task-relatedness)62 (stimulus-
dependency) whole-brain voxel-wise ANOVA was performed.
The main effect of task-relatedness revealed clusters of activation
in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC)/precuneus, the left posterior inferior parietal lobule
(pIPL)/occipital cortex, the left anterior inferior parietal lobule
(aIPL), the right middle frontal gyrus and the left parahippocampal
cortex (PHC)/restrosplenial cortex (Rsp). Examination of the
parameter estimates for each condition revealed that all of these
brain regions were more active during intervals preceding task-
unrelated reports (i.e., mind-wandering and external distractions)
than during intervals preceding task-related reports (i.e., on-task
and task-related interferences), except for the left aIPL and the
right middle frontal gyrus for which the opposite effect was
observed (Figure 2 and Table 2; see also Table S1 for clusters of
activation located outside a priori areas of interest). Thus, in
Table 1. Mean performance for each block according to the responses given to the though-probes.
Mean RTs for the 5 last non-targets Mean CVs for the 5 last non-targets Mean percentage of errors to the targets
On-task 401 (108) 14.89 (5.00) 27.62 (17.59)
TRIs 408 (128) 18.55 (6.70) 46.18 (20.51)
EDs 410 (127) 19.29 (7.40) 46.47 (16.06)
Mind-wandering 411 (136) 18.30 (8.67) 38.12 (20.98)
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. RTs: response times: CVs: coefficients of variation; TRIs: Task-related interferences; EDs: External
distractions. Mean RTs are presented in msec.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016997.t001
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accordance with our hypotheses, DMN regions were associated
with task-unrelated reports, whereas regions outside the DMN that
have been previously linked with executive control and successful
performance during go/no-go tasks (the left aIPL and right middle
frontal gyrus) were associated with task-related reports.
Importantly, not every region of the DMN was associated with
task-unrelated reports, as no evidence of activation in lateral
temporal regions was found in this particular analysis.
The main effect of stimulus-dependency was also associated
with clusters of activations in the MPFC, extending more ventrally
and anteriorly than for the main effect of task-relatedness, as well
as in the PCC/precuneus and the left pIPL (with the latter region
being located somewhat more anteriorly than the region observed
for the main effect of task-relatedness). Other clusters of activations
included the bilateral inferior/middle temporal gyrus (ITG/
MTG), the left MTG and the left inferior frontal gyrus.
Examination of the parameter estimates revealed that all of these
regions were more active in intervals preceding stimulus-
independent reports (i.e., mind-wandering and task-related
interferences) than in intervals preceding stimulus-dependent
Figure 2. Brain areas associated with the main effect of task-relatedness. Regions are displayed at p,0.001, uncorrected for multiple
comparisons with a minimum cluster size of 15 voxels. Bar graphs illustrate the mean parameter estimates (6 standard error of the mean) for each
cluster. SD= stimulus-dependent, SI = stimulus-independent, TR = task-related, TU= task-unrelated, L = left, R = right, MPFC=medial prefrontal cortex,
PCC=posterior cingulate cortex, aIPL = anterior inferior parietal lobe, pIPL = posterior inferior parietal lobe, Occ. cortex = occipital cortex,
Rsp = restrosplenial cortex, PHC=parahippocampal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016997.g002
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reports (i.e., on-task and external distractions; Figure 3 and
Table 2; see also Table S1 for clusters of activation located outside
a priori areas of interest). These results indicate that the core
DMN regions associated with task-unrelated reports are also
associated with stimulus-independent reports. They also extend
the findings of previous studies that used simpler dual-choice
thought-probes and permit to rule out a specific implication of the
DMN in either one or the other of the two dimensions of interest
here. In addition, the main effect of stimulus-dependency revealed
that the lateral temporal regions (also part of the DMN) and the
left inferior frontal gyrus were specifically associated with stimulus-
independent reports.
Finally, although not of primary interest here, the whole-brain
ANOVA also showed a cross-over interaction effect in some brain
regions such as the right middle frontal gyrus, the right ITG, and
the left anterior PHC (Table S1).
Brain regions associated with task-related interferences,
external distractions, and mind-wandering. The intro-
duction of thought-probes providing four possibilities of response
permitted us to examine the brain regions specifically associated
with task-related interferences, external distractions, and mind-
wandering in comparison to being fully focused on the SART. The
direct contrast between task-related interferences and being on-
task revealed a cluster of activation in the right ventral MPFC
(Table 3). The direct contrast between external distractions and
being on-task revealed a small activation in the left dorsal MPFC
(Table 3). Finally, the direct contrast of mind-wandering with
being on-task revealed clusters of activation in the MPFC, the
PCC extending into the left Rsp and PHC, the left pIPL, and
the bilateral ITG/MTG (Figure 4, Table 3; see also Table S2
for clusters of activation located outside a priori areas of
interest).
Considering that task-related interferences and external distrac-
tions were associated with activations in distinct subregions of
MPFC (i.e., ventral versus dorsal MPFC) compared to being on-
task (see Table 3), we also performed direct contrasts between
these two kinds of reports to further examine these possible
differences regarding MPFC activations. No brain region was
more active during external distractions compared to task-related
interferences. The reverse contrast (task-related interferences.ex-
ternal distractions) revealed clusters of activation in the left MTG
(MNI coordinates of peak voxel: 268, 244, 210; t=3.60,
pSVC,0.05) and in the two regions previously associated with task-
related conscious experiences in the whole brain ANOVA: the left
aIPL (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: 248, 256, 52; t=4.05,
pSVC,0.05) and the right middle frontal gyrus (MNI coordinates of
peak voxel: 48, 36, 38; t = 3.69, pSVC,0.05); see also Table S3 for
clusters of activation located outside a priori areas of interest. We
did not find any subregion within MPFC that would be more
strongly associated with one or the other category of reports.
Brain regions showing higher activity during mind-
wandering compared to both task-related interferences
and external distractions. The common involvement of
DMN regions in both task-unrelated reports and stimulus-
independent report, as well as the absence of interaction effect
for these regions and the results of the direct contrasts suggest an
additive effect of the ‘‘task-relatedness’’ and ‘‘stimulus-
dependency’’ dimensions of conscious experiences on DMN
activity. Mind-wandering would be associated with the highest
level of DMN activity, task-related interferences and external
distractions with intermediate levels of DMN activity, and being
fully focused on the SART with the lowest level of activity in this
network. We then conducted a conjunction analysis testing the
conjunction null hypothesis: [(mind-wandering.task-related
interferences) > (mind-wandering.external distractions)] to
confirm that DMN regions are indeed more active during mind-
wandering compared to both task-related interferences and
external distractions. This conjunction analysis revealed clusters
of activations in the MPFC, the PCC/precuneus, and left MTG
(Figure 4, Table 4; see also Table S4 for clusters of activation
located outside a priori areas of interest). These results thus
confirm that the common implication of midline DMN regions in
both task-unrelated and stimulus-independent reports results from
an additive effect of these two dimensions of conscious experiences
on DMN activity.
ROIs analyses. Finally, because (1) our clusters of activation
in the MPFC were rather extended and (2) it has been suggested
that closely juxtaposed portions of the MPFC may perform
different cognitive functions, a 2 (task-relatedness)62 (stimulus-
dependency)62 (regions) repeated measures ANOVA was
performed on the parameter estimates for two subregions of the
MPFC that have been differentially linked to external attention
and mind-wandering/mentalizing in previous studies [8,9,10,36].
As illustrated in Figure 5, the ANOVA demonstrated a main effect
of task-relatedness [F(1,21) = 5.39; p,0.05; partial g2=0.20],
revealing that the two regions showed higher activity for task-
unrelated reports, and a main effect of stimulus-dependency
[F(1,21) = 11.18; p,0.01; partial g2=0.35], revealing that the two
regions showed higher activity for stimulus-independent reports.
The interaction between task-relatedness and stimulus-
dependency was not significant [F(1,21) = 1.61; p=0.22; partial
g2=0.07], indicating an additive effect of these two dimensions.
Furthermore, the main effect of regions was not significant
[F(1,21) = 1.57; p=0.22; partial g2=0.07], and none of the
Table 2. Brain regions associated with the main effects of
task-relatedness and stimulus-dependency in the whole-brain
ANOVA.
MNI coordinates
x y z Voxels F
Main effect of task-related.
MPFC 0 58 22 634 24.11
PCC/Precuneus 28 262 20 50 13.41
L pIPL/occipital cortex 238 280 36 100 15.20
L Rsp, PHC 216 248 0 26 12.43
R middle frontal gyrus 48 38 36 20 14.94
L aIPL 260 248 48 18 14.08
Main effect of stimulus-dep.
MPFC 2 58 22 1206 18.37
Rostral MPFC 22 70 20 103 16.17
PCC/Precuneus 22 250 22 972 19.37
L pIPL 244 272 48 287 16.35
L inf./mid. temporal gyrus 264 222 226 480 22.54
R inf./mid. temporal gyrus 52 214 232 334 21.89
L middle temporal gyrus 264 244 28 308 16.94
L inferior frontal gyrus 252 26 24 191 12.35
Note: All regions are significant at p,0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons
at the voxel level over small volumes of interest (see Methods for details).
L = left, R = right, MPFC =medial prefrontal cortex, PCC =posterior cingulate
cortex, pIPL = posterior inferior parietal lobe, aIPL = anterior inferior parietal
lobe, Rsp = restrosplenial cortex, PHC=parahippocampal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016997.t002
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interaction effects involving regions were significant: task-
relatedness6regions [F(1,21) = 0.65; p=0.43; partial g2=0.03],
stimulus-dependency6regions [F(1,21) = 0.16; p=0.69; partial
g2,0.01], and task-relatedness6stimulus-dependency6regions
[F(1,21) = 0.47; p=0.50; partial g2=0.02], indicating that the
two ROIs showed similar patterns of activations as a function of
the two dimensions of conscious experience under investigation
here. Overall, these results are thus in line with the results of the
whole brain analyses, showing an additive effect of ‘‘task-
relatedness’’ and ‘‘stimulus-dependency’’ on MPFC activity.
Discussion
Previous neuroimaging studies suggest that mind-wandering is
associated with increased DMN activity. However, in these
studies, participants were simply asked to report whether they
Figure 3. Brain areas associated with the main effect of stimulus-dependency. Regions are displayed at p,0.001, uncorrected for multiple
comparisons with a minimum cluster size of 15 voxels. Bar graphs illustrate the mean parameter estimates (6 standard error of the mean) for each
cluster. SD= stimulus-dependent, SI = stimulus-independent, TR = task-related, TU= task-unrelated, L = left, R = right, MPFC=medial prefrontal cortex,
PCC=posterior cingulate cortex, pIPL =posterior inferior parietal lobe, ITG= inferior temporal gyrus, MTG=middle temporal gyrus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016997.g003
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were totally focused on the proposed task (on-task reports) or were
distracted by task-unrelated thoughts (off-task reports), which does
not permit to clearly distinguish between mind-wandering,
external distractions, and task-related interferences. The present
study aimed at clarifying this issue by investigating the neural
correlates of the various kinds of conscious experiences that can
occur while participants perform a task requiring sustained focused
attention and the cognitive processing of external stimuli. Four
classes of conscious experiences (being fully focused on the task,
task-related interferences, external distractions, and mind-wander-
ing) that varied along two dimensions (‘‘task-relatedness’’ and
‘‘stimulus-dependency’’) were sampled using newly designed
thought-probes while participants performed the Sustained
Attention to Response Task (SART [42]).
We found that reports of task-unrelated conscious experiences
were associated with increased activity in the MPFC, the PCC/
precuneus, and the pIPL, all regions of the DMN [1,3,5].
Importantly, increased activity in midline DMN regions was also
associated with reports of stimulus-independent conscious experi-
ences, independently of whether the content of these thoughts was
related to the SART or not. Furthermore, we found that the two
dimensions (i.e., task-relatedness and stimulus-dependency) had
additive effects on the activity of midline DMN regions. External
distractions (i.e. stimulus-dependent and task-unrelated reports)
and task-related interferences (i.e., stimulus-independent and task-
related reports) were associated with intermediate levels of activity,
whereas mind-wandering (i.e., stimulus-independent and task-
unrelated reports) and on-task reports (i.e., stimulus-dependent
and task-related reports) were respectively associated with the
highest and lowest degree of activity in the MPFC and the PCC/
precuneus. Notably, an analysis of variance was performed on the
Figure 4. Brain areas associated with mind-wandering. The brain areas associated with mind-wandering compared to being fully focused on
task are shown in the superior panels. The brains areas associated with mind-wandering compared to both task-related interferences and external
distractions (conjunction analysis) are shown in the inferior panels. Regions are displayed at p,0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons with a
minimum cluster size of 15 voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016997.g004
Table 3. Brain regions associated with task-related
interferences, external distractions, and mind-wandering
compared to being fully focused on task.
MNI coordinates
x y z Voxels t
TRIs.on-task
R ventral MPFC 14 54 212 17 3.32
EDs.on-task
L dorsal MPFC 212 60 18 7 3.47
Mind-wandering.on-task
MPFC 0 58 0 4649 5.83
L PCC/Precuneus, Rsp, PHC 22 256 22 1766 4.57
214 246 4 3.92
220 240 26 3.55
L pIPL 238 272 34 475 3.97
L inf./mid. temporal gyrus 256 216 222 523 4.21
R inf./mid temporal gyrus 50 212 232 181 3.74
Note: All regions are significant at p,0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons
at the voxel level over small volumes of interest (see Methods for details).
TRIs = task-related interferences, EDs = external distractions, L = left, R = right,
MPFC =medial prefrontal cortex, PCC = posterior cingulate cortex,
pIPL =posterior inferior parietal lobe, Rsp = restrosplenial cortex,
PHC=parahippocampal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016997.t003
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parameter estimates of the BOLD response extracted from a
rostral portion of the MPFC previously linked with attention
toward external stimuli [36] and a more caudal portion of the
MPFC previously linked with mentalizing and mind-wandering
[8,36]. This analysis revealed significant main effects of task-
relatedness and stimulus-dependency but no significant main effect
of regions and no significant interaction effect, therefore
demonstrating similar additive effects of the two dimensions of
conscious experiences for both regions of MPFC. Finally, we
found (1) that activity in the lateral temporal lobe—also part of the
DMN [1,3,5]—was related to stimulus-independent reports but
not to task-unrelated reports, (2) that different parts of the lateral
prefrontal cortex were linked to task-related reports and stimulus-
independent reports, and (3) that the aIPL was specifically
activated in relation to task-related reports.
These results are important because they help reconcile
different proposals that have been made regarding the functional
role of the DMN. For instance, Gusnard and Raichle [32] have
proposed that DMN activity reflects a state of unfocused attention
in which both internal thoughts and stimulus from the external
world are gathered and monitored (i.e., task-unrelated conscious
experiences), whereas others [12,13] have linked DMN activity to
a general shift of attention from stimuli in the external
environment toward internal thoughts (i.e., stimulus-independent
conscious experiences). The present findings suggest that these two
views are not mutually exclusive and show that both the ‘‘task-
relatedness’’ and ‘‘stimulus-dependency’’ dimensions of conscious
experiences are related to DMN activity. Indeed, these two
dimensions had additive effects on DMN activity, such that mind-
wandering episodes were associated with the highest degree of
DMN activity but attention towards external task-unrelated stimuli
(i.e., external distractions) and thoughts related to the appraisal of
the SART (i.e., task-related interferences) were also associated with
higher DMN activity compared to being fully focused on the task.
These results thus highlight the importance of simultaneously
considering the task-related and stimulus-dependent dimensions of
ongoing conscious experience when attempting to link DMN
activity to particular cognitive functions.
The MPFC, PCC/precuneus, and pIPL were engaged during
both task-unrelated and stimulus-independent conscious experi-
ences. This result suggests that these regions underlie cognitive
processes active during both unfocused attention toward external
stimuli and internal thoughts. A possibility is that increased activity
in these DMN regions (especially midline regions) reflects the
engagement of cognitive processes involved in monitoring the self-
relevance of the ongoing content of consciousness [56,57,58,59],
independently of whether it refers to current sensory input or
internal thought. Previous research has shown that self-relevant
thoughts are an important part of the spontaneous cognitive
activity at rest and that reports of these thoughts correlate with
activity in midline DMN regions [60]. The MPFC and PCC/
precuneus have also been implicated in self-referential judgments
of external stimuli [56,61,62], and activity in these regions is
parametrically modulated by the degree of self-relatedness of the
stimuli [63]. Furthermore, a recent study has shown that activity in
the hubs of the DMN, namely the MPFC and PCC, correlates
with the use of self-referential strategies when making self-
referential or nonpersonal semantic judgments [33]. Given that
the content of many mind-wandering episodes is personally
significant [11,64] and often involves thoughts about one’s most
important current concerns [65,66], the larger activation of the
MPFC and PCC/precuneus that we observed during mind-
wandering could be related to the higher degree of self-relevance
of these thoughts in comparison to task-related interferences and
external distractions. Further research should be conducted to
assess this possibility.
The moderate level of DMN activity related to external
distractions and task-related interferences might suggest that both
are intermediate states preceding the occurrence of mind-
wandering. There is some behavioral evidence that the occurrence
of mind-wandering is not an all or nothing phenomenon but
follows a gradual temporal sequence [49,67]. Regarding brain
Figure 5. Mean parameters estimates for a rostral portion versus a more caudal portion of the MPFC. Mean parameter estimates
(averaged over all voxels within a 4-mm radius of the peak voxel) for each of the four conditions (relative to the baseline) in two regions of the medial
prefrontal cortex. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. SD= stimulus-dependent, SI = stimulus-independent, TR = task-related,
TU= task-unrelated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016997.g005
Table 4. Brain regions more active during mind-wandering
compared to both task-related interferences and external
distractions (conjunction analysis).
MNI coordinates
x y z Voxels t
MPFC 0 60 22 310 3.79
PCC/Precuneus 24 260 22 25 3.35
L middle temporal gyrus 256 216 222 27 3.28
Note: All regions are significant at p,0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons
at the voxel level over small volumes of interest (see Methods for details).
L = left, MPFC =medial prefrontal cortex, PCC =posterior cingulate cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016997.t004
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activity, some authors have suggested that increased DMN activity
does not necessarily reflect mind-wandering until a certain
threshold of activation is reached [68]. For these authors, the
DMN could be involved in a continuous generation of predictions
of the future based on the content of long-term memory [1,69,70].
The function of these predictions would be to guide our actions
according to the particular context in which we behave [71,72]. It
might be that mind-wandering is the by-product of the continuous
generation of predictions underlain by the DMN [68]. Thus, the
intermediate level of DMN activity in association with external
distractions and task-related interferences could prefigure the
occurrence of mind-wandering, indicating that the cognitive
processes involved in the generation of predictions are more
active than when one is fully focused on the SART but not yet
sufficiently active to uncouple attention from both external stimuli
and the current task. However, whether mind-wandering episodes
are always preceded by either task-related interferences or external
distractions has not yet been precisely investigated. Studies
focusing more specifically on the temporal sequence of brain
activity and conscious experiences leading to mind-wandering
should be conducted to assess this question.
Another interpretation of our findings would be that the
increased midline DMN activity, and especially MPFC activity
[9,73], related to mind-wandering in comparison to task-related
interferences and external distractions reflects an increased effort
to reorient attention toward the SART. However, the fact that
these regions are usually more active when there is no particular
task to perform (e.g., at rest) than during cognitive tasks argues
against this possibility. Furthermore, Christoff et al. [16] recently
found that midline DMN regions are more active when
participants are unaware rather than aware that their mind is
currently off-task. If activity in these regions reflected efforts to
refocus on the task being performed, the opposite pattern of
activity should have been observed, as awareness would presum-
ably favor the recruitment of cognitive processes to reorient
attention on task.
Among the DMN regions, the lateral temporal lobes were
linked to stimulus-independent reports but not to task-unrelated
reports. This finding indicates that distinct subregions within the
DMN are related to specific dimensions of conscious experiences,
which is in agreement with recent studies demonstrating the
heterogeneity of the DMN and its fractionation in subcomponents
that might support different cognitive processes [33,34,35]. The
lateral temporal lobes have been implicated in various kinds of
tasks involving a decoupling of attention from the immediate
environment, such as mental time travel in the past and the future
or the production of conceptual judgments about presented words
[21,22,74]. More specifically, these regions may be involved in the
processing of semantic and conceptual information that is used in
judgment making and memory construction [74,75,76]. The
activation of lateral temporal regions in relation to stimulus-
independent conscious experiences in this study might therefore
reflect the access to the personal and general semantic knowledge
that constitutes, in part, the content of these thoughts.
Stimulus-independent reports were also characterized by
activity in the inferior frontal gyrus, a region that has been linked
to executive functions and goal-directed activities [77,78]. Two
different explanations could account for this result. First, activation
in this region might be related to attempts to control the content of
consciousness, and thus to suppress thoughts that impair current
task performance [79]. The lateral prefrontal cortex has indeed
been linked to thought suppression processes [80]. However, it
typically activates in a sustained manner during periods requiring
cognitive control and no evidence of its transient activation has
been found in situations where participants actively need to
suppress a particular thought from working memory. As cognitive
control was required throughout the whole SART, a specific
increase of activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex in only some
trials is difficult to explain. The second explanation is that
stimulus-independent thoughts are a demanding mental activity
that entails the recruitments of brain regions involved in executive
functions [16,43]. This suggestion is supported by behavioral
studies which demonstrated that the frequency of stimulus-
independent thoughts decreases with increasing executive de-
mands of the task currently being performed, suggesting that
executive resources can be recruited either by the current task or
by stimulus-independent thoughts [81,82]. As previously men-
tioned, Christoff et al. [83] have found that off-task thoughts not
only recruit DMN regions but also executive network regions,
suggesting a processing overlap between mind-wandering and
central executive resources. Furthermore, a recent fMRI study has
shown that the lateral prefrontal cortex can couple its activity with
the DMN during internalized autobiographical planning [84].
Interestingly, a possible function of stimulus-independent thoughts
may precisely be to prepare for upcoming events and to manage
one’s current concerns [43,54]. The activation of the inferior
frontal gyrus during stimulus-independent conscious experiences
might therefore be related to executive processes involved in the
management of personal goals and concerns, rather than processes
involved in the suppression of one’s thoughts.
Finally, in contrast to the posterior lateral prefrontal activation
related to stimulus-independent reports, a more anterior region of
the middle frontal gyrus and the aIPL were specifically activated in
relation to task-related reports. The middle frontal gyrus is usually
considered as being part of the dorsal attention network, a set of
dorsal brain regions supporting top-down focused attention toward
external stimuli [18,51,85]. Regarding the aIPL, several studies
have recently demonstrated that this region commonly co-
activates with those involved in executive functions and goal-
directed activities, such as the middle frontal gyrus and the
anterior cingulate cortex [23,35,86,87,88]. Furthermore, meta-
analyses performed on neuroimaging studies involving go/no-go
tasks have shown that successful performance on these tasks is
associated with activations in a frontoparietal network comprising
the middle frontal gyrus and aIPL [89,90,91]. Our results are in
agreement with these previous findings, as increased activity in
these two regions were related to the highest rate of attention
directed toward the SART, both subjectively with thought-probe
reports and objectively with task performance (i.e., less errors and
less variability of RTs for task-related reports). These results also
further demonstrate the validity of subjective reports in neuroim-
aging studies and suggest that this kind of procedure is not only
reliable to study mind-wandering and other forms of task-
unrelated attention but could also be useful to study on-task
thoughts, such as the various strategies that can be used in
problem solving, multitasking or encoding complex material, for
instance (see [92] for a more extended discussion on this topic).
To conclude, this study demonstrates that task-relatedness and
stimulus-dependency are both related to DMN activity. Notably,
an additive effect of these two dimensions of conscious experiences
was demonstrated for the MPFC and PCC/precuneus. On the
other hand, other DMN regions were specifically related to only
one dimension, with activity in lateral temporal regions being
solely related to stimulus-independent reports. These results have
two broad implications. First, they reveal the necessity to take both
dimensions into account when attempting to determine the
functional role of the DMN. This could help resolve controversies
as to the role of the DMN in internal versus external attention
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[8,9,10]. Second, the present results further demonstrate that the
DMN is not unitary and suggest that its constituent regions might
fulfill different cognitive functions [33,34,35]. We tentatively
propose that the gradual recruitment of the MPFC and PCC/
precuneus with task-unrelatedness and stimulus-independence
reflects increasing self-referential processes [56,57,58,59,60] or
processes involved in the generation of predictions of the future
that are based on long-term memory content [1,19,69,72]. These
two possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and it has recently
been demonstrated that MPFC engagement during memory
retrieval is stronger when the retrieved material is self-referential
[93]. On the other hand, the activity in lateral temporal regions in
relation to stimulus-independent conscious experiences could
reflect the access to the semantic information and knowledge that
are used to construct these thoughts [74,75]. Further investigations
should be conducted to assess these possibilities in more detail.
The study of ongoing conscious experience has been relatively
overlooked in neuroscience, despite having a long history of
research in cognitive psychology [43,94,95]. The present findings
(see also [16,41]) provide evidence that it is nonetheless feasible
and may prove fruitful in elucidating the precise functional role of
the DMN in human cognition.
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